8.2. A Public Interest Institution is Undesirable or Dangerous

Contents - Index

8.2. A Public Interest Institution is Undesirable or Dangerous (Top)

A Frontal Attack: American Political Institutions are Not Failing
This critique jumps directly on our premise that the American "Republic" and its institutions are in fact failing. These attacks will come from reactionaries and supporters of the status quo. Usually, these critics will argue that not only has the system not failed but that the empowerment of public interest nets will have devastating effects on the country, such as the tyranny of the majority and the vulgarization of civil society. This is where we must argue well and summon the literature that makes the case that our institutions indeed have failed and that it is a systemic failure and not simply a situational and transient phenomenon.

Excessive Concentration of Personal Power Concern
A serious concern is that a very few A-Nets will monopolize attention in the Public Interest Network and thereby become too powerful with no checks on that power and no accountability through elections. This concern is intensified by the fact that the leaders of A-Nets tend to be young and inexperienced in government matters and politics. Will the power to command the attention of high government officials go to the heads of these young people? The concern for monopolization comes partly from theories of attention distribution on the Internet (like the power law theory) that predict that what starts out as a network of many weblogs shrinks to one or two large nets like Google. This concern must be taken seriously, but there is currently no evidence that these Internet "laws" will apply to the public interest network phenomenon. So far, the objects of the power law have been simple services delivered in a top-down manner, whereas the public interest network is a complex and diverse bottom-up phenomenon involving broadly ranging and ever-changing issues and issue contexts. One or two or twenty A-Nets cannot address all of the issues and concerns that the public has and when they don't another net will emerge. Size may also be a limiting factor in that after certain thresholds, an advocacy net must add staff and begin to behave more like a traditional public interest group. At that point, it will not be able to facilitate members and they will leave to set up other A-nets. We will not be able to address this concern fully until research currently underway is completed.

The Race to the Bottom Complaint
This criticism says that any wacko with a personal gripe and a computer can create an advocacy net and take to the air. Our response is that taking to the air is one thing, getting any attention is another. An issue has to be compelling for it to bubble-up in the public interest network. If the message is compelling, then it should be given attention - even if some few think it is wacko.

A Broadside Attack: the Digital Divide, Class Differences, and the War Phenomenon
This criticism is that a public interest institution should not be implemented because it does NOT represent the "people." Our reaction is that the A-Network is a spontaneous phenomenon and already emerging, so the criticism is academic unless they are implying that it should be stopped. If so, by whom? Regarding representativeness, the criticism has some validity because many people do not have access to the Internet and because those that don't may be different. This so-called "digital divide" is rapidly closing as computers and the costs of the Internet come down. Obviously, there will remain a small number who do not have access, the same way that a small number do not have telephones or indoor plumbing for that matter.

The broader criticism is that participants differ from non-participants in socio-economic class and education. This too is likely true to some extent, but the important question is whether the public interest group differs meaningfully from non-participants in political attitudes and positions on important issues. Critics point to apparent differences on the issue of the war on Iraq and defense against terrorism as evidence of this disparity. There are at least two major related phenomena at work here. The first is that participants tend to be more deliberative and engaged and have deliberated issues such as war with Iraq. Non-participants tend to be turned off by the system, apathetic, and disengaged and look to papa government to tell them how to think about these kinds of issues. The second phenomenon is that ruling governments define the issues and control the symbols and employ propaganda to get popular consent. Public opinion polling is also influenced by the government's definition of issues so questions are asked in such a way as to be biased toward the government's positions. Public interest net participants are less vulnerable to this phenomenon and so their opinions will generally differ. Another way to put this is that if people participated and deliberated issues and if they were not exposed to government propaganda, there would not be much difference in political opinions. In this important sense, members of public interests groups do represent the people.

The Argument that Public Interest Advocacy Nets Would Destabilize the Political System
This critique is that public interest groups as a collective should not be empowered with extended participation because this will cause great friction among groups and between the groups and government. This, they claim, would undermine the status quo balance of powers and disrupt traditional decision-making. In effect, these critics argue that apathy and non-engagement of citizens is a good thing in democratic systems. The argument against this is that participation is known to have exactly the opposite effect by opening the mind to alternative views.

The Fly in the Ointment Criticisms
While the Internet is the instrument that makes this new form of participatory democracy possible, it is by its very nature not the property of the people's watchdog and advocacy institution itself - or anyone else. Consequently, we can expect that detractors will ask rhetorically, "What is to prevent the bad guys from using it?" If critics are simply saying that reactionaries might use the Internet the same way as liberals or vice versa, then the answer is simple. Great! That is as it should be - as long as there is no attempt to restrict the use of the Internet itself. To work FOR the expansion of democracy, the Internet must also be open to those who might work AGAINST the expansion of democracy. Also, at the very core of democracy are the principles of unfettered information and the free competition of ideas.

The Terrorist Conspiracy Critique
If the critics' concern is that terrorists may use the Internet and use technologies similar to the Peoples Institution to do their evil work, then if the alleged terrorists are truly terrorists and not simply political dissidents, then action must be taken to help identify them and stop their terrorist activities - not restrict the use of the Internet. However, the difference between dissidents and terrorists is not always absolutely clear and the government and ruling groups may label any opponent or opponents as "terrorists" or subversives. So, specific instances of this kind of alleged abuse must be analyzed and the truth determined through democratic deliberation.

The Strawman Critique
Variations on the frontal attack critique include those that will attack "Direct Democracy" and then infer that the arguments against institutions like initiatives, propositions, and referenda generalize to expanding democracy through the Internet. The weakness of this is that initiatives are often driven by special interests and are voted on by the general public and do not even involve informed professionals as in the case of public interest groups. Moreover, all initiatives are not bad. In fact, initiatives may be among the instruments through which public advocacy groups might legitimately act.

The Runaway Majority Critique
The more general concern of some may be that public interest groups with new power might lead to abuses of that power or at least serious unanticipated consequences. The first part of this is the old question of who watches the watcher? The counter argument would present the fact that actual changes in laws and policies must still go through the established institutions and presumably checks and balances will come into play should one institution succumb to the influence of a public interest group. Also, every interpretation of the public interest by one group or even several groups still exists in an environment of thousands of groups and so that "misinterpretations" of the public interest will be detected and deliberated by other groups and acted upon if different. If there is complete agreement on an interpretation of a matter of public interest after deliberation, then it must be taken that way - even if the powers that be don't like it.

The Unanticipated Consequences Critique
Regarding unanticipated consequences, we should play mind games and listen seriously to critics who raise this concern to identify and either explain or provide for supposedly negative outcomes. An interesting example of this kind of concern is that there is a fine line between vigilance and vigilantism and that unruly empowered public interest groups might be inclined to cross that line.

Tyranny of the Majority Argument
A powerful independent public interest institution would lead to the abuse of power by the public resulting in anti-business and growth policies and other bad policies.

Grid Lock Argument
A powerful independent public interest institution would lead to a stalemated system in which important policy-making could not be done.

Accountability Argument
A-Nets have no formal organization and charters to assure accountability to members and to the general public.

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Materials

References

Bachrach, Peter, The Theory of Democratic Elitism (Little, Brown and Company: Boston, 1967).
Barber, Benjamin R., Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age
Harrison, John R., The Reactionaries: A Study of the Anti-Democratic Intelligentsia (Schocken Books: New York, 1966)
Kaufman, Arnold, "Human Nature and Participatory Democracy," in Carl J. Friedrich, (Ed.), Responsibility: Nomos III (The Liberal Arts Press, New York, 1960).
Kaufman, Arnold S., The Radical Liberal The New Politics: Theory and Practice (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1968).
Michels, Robert, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (New York: Dover, 1962).
Schumpeter, Joseph, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (3rd ed.; New York, 1950).
Shea, John C., (Ed.), Arguments on American Politics (Brooks/Cole: Pacific Grove, California).

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